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Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence#  
By Klemens Kappel and Frederik J. Andersen 
Forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, October 2019 
Abstract  
This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational 
way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A 
and B, disagree as to whether p, A says p while B says not-p, this is higher-order 
evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in 
coming to believe that p (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higher-
order evidence is not defeated, then one rationally ought to reduce one’s confidence 
with respect to the proposition in question. We term this the higher-order evidence 
account (the HOE account), and present it as superior to what we might call 
standard conciliationism, which holds that when agents A and B disagree about p, 
and are (known) epistemic peers, they should both suspend judgement about p or 
adjust their confidence towards the mean of A and B’s prior credences in p. Many 
have suspected that standard conciliationism is implausible and may have skeptical 
implications. After presenting the HOE account, we put it to work by applying it to 
                                               
#  We have presented this material at workshops in London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. Thanks 
to audiences there for helpful comments, in particular Julien Dutant, Alexander Heape and 
participants in LVU18, Lisbon.   
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a range of cases of moral disagreement, including those that have featured in recent 
debates assuming standard conciliationism. We show that the HOE account support 
reasonable, non-skeptical verdicts in a range of cases. Note that this is a paper on 
moral disagreement, not on the HOE account, thus the account is merely stated here, 
while defended more fully elsewhere.1  
 
1. Introduction  
Much discussion of moral (peer) disagreement explores various versions of what 
we might call standard conciliationism, holding that when agents A and B disagree 
about p, and are (known) epistemic peers, they should both suspend judgement 
about p.2 The equal weight view holds that A and B should rather adjust their 
confidence towards the mean of A and B’s prior credences in p. For discussions of 
moral (peer) disagreement and implications, see e.g. (Besong 2014; Christensen 
2007; Christensen 2011; Matheson 2016; McGrath 2008; Rowland 2017b; Vavova 
2014). Two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to p, when they have access 
to the same body of evidence, are equally adept in interpreting the evidence, and 
have scrutinized it equally carefully. As has been observed, perhaps no individuals 
are epistemic peers, strictly speaking, and hence we might want to talk about 
                                               
1 (Kappel 2018). 
2 Note that the term ’conciliationism’ is also used in a somewhat broader sense, denoting views 
stating that in peer disagreements one should reduce one’s confidence in the disputed belief.  
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approximate peers instead, see e.g. (Lackey 2010). We will set these complications 
aside, and henceforth simply talk about conciliationism and epistemic peers, unless 
otherwise indicated. Much current discussion in moral epistemology explore the 
epistemological implications of conciliationism, which may be a thorough moral 
skepticism.  
 This paper outlines what we hope to be a more plausible general view of 
disagreement, the higher-order evidence account (HOE account). We argue that the 
HOE account is both better motivated than standard conciliationism, and that it 
supports intuitively plausible verdicts in a range of different cases of moral 
disagreement. 
 The HOE account argues, first, that disagreement generally provides 
defeasible higher-order evidence that one has made an error; either by following a 
faulty belief forming procedure for collecting or interpreting evidence (what we 
term a principle error), by making a mistake in following a good one (a 
performance error), or by failing to consider relevant evidence (an evidence error). 
Second, when such higher-order evidence is strong enough, and not defeated, one 
should rationally reduce confidence in one’s first-order view.  
 After briefly outlining the HOE account (section 2), we put the HOE account 
to work on the problem of moral disagreement. We do so by distinguishing various 
cases of moral disagreement, all featuring different structures (section 3). In 
applying the HOE account to these cases, we will ask whether these kinds of 
disagreements give an agent strong undefeated higher-order evidence to the effect 
that she has made a mistake on her first-order level of reasoning. We hope that this 
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will show that the HOE account provides intuitively plausible results in various 
types of disagreements, and that the HOE account is overall more plausible than the 
standard conciliationism.3 
 
2. Higher-order evidence and disagreement 
In this section we briefly outline the HOE account, though a full defense of it is the 
project of other work.4 The general idea that disagreement counts as higher-order 
evidence is familiar, yet we think that our specific version of the view is new, and 
as will be clear shortly, various of these details matter for how the HOE account 
responds to moral disagreement. For similar or related views, see e.g. (Bergmann 
2009; Horowitz 2014; Kelly 2010; Kelly 2013a). 
 To appreciate the significance of higher-order evidence it is helpful first to 
focus on a case that does not involve disagreement:  
                                               
3 Throughout the paper, we will assume that moral intuitions and moral beliefs can be right or 
wrong/true or false, and that we are epistemically committed (as well as morally committed) to have 
true moral views. So, in effect we treat moral beliefs and moral intuitions just like ordinary factual 
beliefs and factual intellectual seemings, or dispositions to judge in certain ways. We also freely 
assume that rational credences in propositions come in quantitative degrees, i.e. a credence in p can 
be represented by a number between 0 and 1. 
4 This section is based on material first published in (Kappel 2018). 
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The Pill. Suppose I consider a mathematical problem on the basis of some 
evidence E. Suppose that E entails that p is the correct answer to the 
mathematical problem. After careful scrutiny I come to believe that the 
correct answer is p. I am then told by a credible source that without noticing 
I have ingested a reason-distorting pill that makes me completely unreliable 
with respect to those kinds of mathematical problems, though this is not in 
any way perceptible to me.5  
 
The Pill invites the following intuition: after being informed about my ingestion of 
the pill, I am no longer rationally highly justified in my belief that p. I should adjust 
my confidence so that it reflects my evidence concerning the high likelihood that 
my reasoning is impaired because of the pill. It would, for example, be highly 
irresponsible of me to bet my fortune on the truth of p, or to regard p as true without 
qualification in my theoretical reasoning.6 In other words, upon being told about 
the pill, I should reduce my first-order credence.  
 Assuming that we accept this basic intuition about the case, note a couple of 
additional things. First, even if I did in fact get my first-order evidence right, the 
advent of the evidence that I have ingested the reasoning-distorting pill should lead 
                                               
5 This case is adapted from (Christensen 2011, pp. 5-6). 
6 Cf. Horowitz’s discussion of epistemic akrasia (2014). 
  
 
6 
me to significantly reduce my confidence in my object-level belief. Suppose that 
the reasoning-distorting pill gives me a 90% chance of being affected and a 10% 
chance of being unaffected. In fact, I am lucky and my reasoning capacities are not 
impaired, so I correctly see that E provides very strong evidence for p. Even so, we 
submit, I should significantly reduce my confidence in p. Second, I should reduce 
confidence even if my higher-order evidence is misleading. Suppose that, quite 
uncharacteristically, and in ways I cannot detect and have no reason to suspect, my 
credible source is wrong. In fact, I have not ingested the reasoning-distorting pill. 
Yet, I should reduce my confidence that I am right.  
 Third, and very important for our discussions below, my higher-order 
evidence can be rebutted or undercut (see e.g. Pollock 1970, 1986). Suppose I learn 
from a credible source that I have ingested a reasoning-distorting pill without 
noticing. I am also told, however, from another credible source, that I happen to be 
one of very few people on whom the active ingredient has no effect. Or suppose 
that I learn that, uncharacteristically, the source telling me about the pill has a strong 
incentive to mislead me (it turns out that he will win a large prize if he succeeds in 
making me waver in my answer to the mathematical problem). In these cases, I 
have received evidence undercutting my higher-order evidence. Or suppose that a 
trustworthy source tells me that my reasoning in these kinds of cases are actually 
correct, despite apparently having ingested the pill, and repeatedly so. This would 
tend to rebut the evidence that I have actually ingested a reasoning-distorting pill, 
or it would undercut the testimonial evidence that this is so. Generally, when higher-
order evidence that would otherwise make me propositionally justified in a negative 
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higher-order belief is undercut or rebutted, I am not propositionally justified in that 
higher-order belief, and thus, not obliged to reduce credence in my first-order belief.  
 Note, finally, that the epistemic impact of the higher-order evidence in The 
Pill is quite significant. Intuitively, if I believe that the reasoning-distorting pill 
makes me just as likely to be right as wrong in my answer to the mathematical 
puzzle, then it seems that I should adjust my confidence in p from about full 
certainty to 0.5. If, however, I believe that p is just one of many possible answers 
to the problem, all but one is false, and I believe that the pill makes me pick a 
random answer, then my credence that I have the right answer should be less than 
0.5. Indeed, it seems that I should be almost entirely certain that I got the wrong 
answer. This remarkable effect of higher-order evidence arises despite the fact that 
the higher-order evidence in question has no bearing on the first-order proposition. 
By itself, the fact that I have ingested a reason distorting pill does not speak to the 
truth of the mathematical proposition in question – it does not bear on the truth or 
falsity of p, nor the evidential relation between E and p, and it may still be true that 
my evidence E entails p, and further I may even have correctly apprehended that E 
entails p. See also the discussion in David Christensen’s paper “Formulating 
Independence” (2019). 
 We suggest that disagreements generally provide higher-order evidence of 
this kind. When I believe p, and you believe that p is false, this is generally evidence 
that I may have made a mistake when forming my belief that p. The fact that you 
reject p is prima facie first-order evidence that p is false, which should be weighed 
against my evidence suggesting that p is true. But our disagreement is also higher-
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order evidence that I may have made a mistake: I may have employed a wrong 
method or principle when collecting or assessing the evidence (a principle error), I 
may have employed a right method or principle but made an error in my application 
of it (a performance error), or there may be relevant evidence that I should have 
considered (an evidence error).7 This is all higher-order evidence that there might 
be something wrong with the way I have formed my belief. As we have seen, when 
undefeated, higher-order evidence can significantly impact one’s first-order 
credences. This is the HOE account in its most basic form.  
 
2.1 The HOE account, non-conciliationism, and standard 
conciliationism 
Though the HOE account is conciliationist in spirit, it formally counts as non-
conciliationist, in so far as it admits there to be cases of peer disagreement where 
one should not conciliate (see discussion below). We will now briefly compare the 
HOE account to other non-conciliationist views. A prominent class of these are 
what one might call first-person views: I am entitled to accord my own basic moral 
intuitions greater epistemic weight than those of others, and thus I can sometimes 
                                               
7 Of course, epistemic peers cannot have different evidence, and maybe peers cannot differ with 
respect to whether they commit a principle error. This leaves performance errors as the only option 
for explaining peer disagreement, which by itself seems plausible. But ordinary disagreements, of 
course, often involve different sets of evidence, and a general theory about disagreement should 
cover such cases. 
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remain steadfast even in the face of moral peer disagreement (Enoch 2010; 
Wedgewood 2010). The main problem with these views, we contend, is the 
difficulty of motivating that one’s own basic moral intuitions are epistemically 
privileged vis-à-vis those of a similarly situated peer. We also find it hard to see 
how the higher-order evidence that one might be mistaken in one’s moral intuition 
can be ignored. The HOE account is more plausible than the various first-person 
views because it avoids these problems. Other non-conciliationist views focus on 
the degree of epistemic justification of one’s view by first-order evidence. Roughly, 
if A’s belief that p is epistemically justified by a given pool of first-order evidence, 
and B’s belief that not-p is not, then A should not conciliate. We count Lackey, 
Kelly and Weatherson (Lackey 2010; Kelly 2010; Weatherson 2019) among those 
championing this sort of view. Again, the main challenge, we think, to these views 
is that they do not acknowledge the significance of higher-order evidence. In The 
Pill I am presumably maximally warranted by my first-order evidence to believe p, 
and yet, intuitively because of the higher-order evidence I should lower my 
credence in p considerably. In recent debates many have denied, in various ways, 
that higher-order evidence can rationally affect what one should rationally believe 
on the basis of first-order evidence – the levels split up as far as epistemic rationality 
is concerned (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014; Titelbaum 2015; Weatherson 2008, 2019; 
Williamson 2011). A full defense of the HOE account needs to address this batch 
of objections. Unfortunately, we cannot do so here, but see discussions in (Horowitz 
2014; Kappel 2019; Sliwa and Horowitz 2015a, 2015b).  
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 Let us now briefly compare the HOE account to standard conciliationism. 
First, note that standard conciliationism is often motivated by considerations about 
the significance of higher-order evidence constituted by disagreement. However, as 
standard conciliationism is stated, the strength of higher-order evidence drops out 
of the picture; all that matters is whether one is facing an epistemic peer or not. So, 
standard conciliationism displays no sensitivity to whether the higher-order 
evidence arising from a peer disagreement is defeated or not. Instead, how one 
should respond to disagreement is a simple function of whether the agent one 
disagrees with is a (known) epistemic peer. For reasons that should become clear 
below, this make the HOE account more plausible than standard conciliationism. 
 Second, standard conciliationism is restricted to cases of epistemic peerhood, 
while HOE account is general and not tied to such a restriction; it is not even tied 
to cases of disagreement. Yet, disagreements with non-peers seem clearly 
epistemically significant. Suppose that I am a medical doctor with a known track 
record of getting a certain type of diagnosis right 80% of the time. My junior 
colleague has a known track record of 60%. It turns out that we disagree about a 
particular patient; I am initially quite confident that the patient has the diagnosis in 
question, but my colleague is sure that this is not the case. Intuitively, this should 
make me reduce my confidence that I am right – after all, my colleague is right 60% 
of the time, and this should give me some reason to think that I might have made a 
mistake. Yet, my junior colleague is not my peer on this question. The HOE account 
easily explains why I should pause: my disagreement with my colleague is higher-
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order evidence that I might have made a mistake, which should lead me to reduce 
my confidence. 
 Third, standard conciliationism concerns two-person cases, leaving it open 
how one should respond to cases involving more than two individuals. Suppose I 
believe p, and realize that many reasonably competent individuals independently of 
one another believe not-p. For reasons originally discovered by Condorcet, this 
would be very impressive evidence that not-p is true, and thus very strong higher-
order evidence that I have made a mistake. Likewise, if I believe p, and you believe 
not-p, but it turns out that many other competent individuals independently of one 
another side with me, then again this is strong evidence for p, even if none of the 
other individuals are as competent as I am with respect to the issue we disagree 
about.8 The HOE account can accommodate what seems to be epistemically 
significant facts about independence: suppose that I hold p, and it turns out that I 
disagree with many other individuals, but they do not form beliefs independently 
of one another – in fact, they all blindly follow just one individual. This is a very 
different situation from the previous one: the evidence provided from a 
disagreement featuring this structure is rather similar to me just disagreeing with 
one individual. 
                                               
8 For discussions of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, and the significance of independent belief formation 
and consensus, see e.g. (Lackey 2013; List 2001; Goldman 2001).  
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 Fourth, as we think of it, the HOE account is not wedded to the Independence 
Principle. As Christensen originally stated this principle, it says: 
 
Independence Principle. In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s 
expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify 
my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the 
reasoning behind my initial belief about P.9 
 
The Independence Principle seems intuitively very plausible and is motivated by 
intuitions about question-begging. When A and B disagree about p it seems that A 
cannot use his belief that p to reason as follows: p, so B must be wrong in her belief 
that not-p, hence there is no reason to modify my own belief. Clearly, this pattern 
of reasoning seems question-begging. Yet, the Independence Principle remains 
controversial.10 We claim that the HOE view is not wedded to the Independence 
Principle in the form stated, though clearly some restrictions regarding question-
begging patterns of reasoning will need to be adopted by any plausible view. For 
example, in The Pill I cannot use my belief that E supports p to argue that I have 
                                               
9 (Christensen 2011, p.1). 
10 For discussion, see e.g. (Christensen 2009, 2011; Lord 2014; Moon 2018; Sosa 2010). For 
Christensen’s most recent defense of a modified version of the Independence Principle, see 
(Christensen 2019). 
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not been drugged after all. This is both because my mathematical evidence E does 
not bear on whether I am drugged or not, but also because using first-order evidence 
that p to dismiss evidence that one has misjudged the evidence that p seems 
question-begging.11 
 Fifth, the HOE account does not seem to depend on whether we accept 
permissivism or uniqueness about first order-evidence (Kelly 2013b; Matheson 
2011; Rosa 2012; White 2013). Think again about the Pill. Surely, we can assume 
that the mathematical first-order evidence considered on its own uniquely 
determines that full belief in p is the uniquely rational attitude to have. Yet, even 
granting this, the higher-order evidence should make one reduce one’s first-order 
confidence. Assume then that permissivism is true, and suppose that my initial level 
of credence in some first-order proposition p is one of several permitted attitudes. I 
then receive higher-order evidence that I may have made a mistake when forming 
this attitude. Shouldn’t that make me pause, make me less certain in my belief, even 
if there are other permitted attitudes?  
 We cannot present a full defense of the HOE account here, but we want to 
note again that the core idea – that higher-order evidence can impact first-order 
epistemic rationality even when the higher-order evidence in question does not bear 
on the truth of the first-order proposition – is not without prominent critics. See in 
                                               
11 So, we submit that the HOE account will support restrictions somewhat similar to but not identical 
to the Independence Principle. We cannot develop the details of this here, but see (Kappel and 
Andersen unpublished manuscript). 
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particular (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014; Horowitz 2014; Kappel 2019; Sliwa and 
Horowitz 2015a, 2015b; Titelbaum 2015; Weatherson 2019; Worsnip 2018).  
 
3. Moral disagreement and higher-order evidence 
We now apply the HOE account to moral disagreement. We don’t assume that 
moral disagreement is fundamentally different from disagreements in other 
domains, granted of course, the that moral convictions are just ordinary beliefs. 
However, recent discussion of moral disagreement has featured discussion of a 
range of cases, most notably what we below term evil disagreement, comprehensive 
disagreement, deep disagreement and fundamental disagreement. Evil 
disagreements and fundamental disagreements are, arguably, distinctive for the 
moral domain. Also, the current debate has featured the suspicion that standard 
conciliationism is implausible because it leads to skepticism, and this is in part 
because epistemic peerhood may be more difficult to dismiss in the moral domain 
than elsewhere. These are general reasons for applying the HOE account to the 
moral domain in the hopes of showing that it supports more plausible answers than 
standard conciliationism.  
 One important implication of the HOE account is that not all cases of 
disagreement will be treated equally; what basically matters is the extent to which 
disagreement provides undefeated higher-order evidence of a certain kind which in 
turn depend on the structure of the disagreements. Thus, how one should react to 
disagreements depend on the details of the structure of the disagreement, and not 
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merely on whether the disagreement is between peers. We now present a variety of 
types of moral disagreement, including the cases discussed in the literature. 
 
3.1 Local benign disagreements 
Consider the following:  
 
Local benign disagreement. A clearly intuits that criminal offenders deserve 
punishment, while B has an equally clear intuition that criminals do not per 
se deserve punishment. Other disagreements between A and B are either 
irrelevant to the issue at hand, or they are direct consequences of these 
conflicting moral intuitions. 
 
It seems that some actual cases of moral disagreement have this structure. People 
just appear to have different moral intuitions about specific matters, though the 
exact extent to which this is true is of course a difficult empirical question. This 
case is a local disagreement in that it concerns one specific moral intuition, i.e. a 
moral judgement about a particular case, or as in the case above, a more or less 
general moral principle, where this judgement is based on an intuition. We take an 
intuition to be a kind of intellectual seeming; an urge to see a certain proposition as 
true, though not based on inference from other propositions. The case is also a 
benign form of disagreement because the intuitions that set A and B apart are not 
evil or spurious in any way, i.e. the intuitions are not by themselves evidence of 
moral depravation or insensitivity to moral truth (see discussion below). From A’s 
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perspective the disagreement with B gives her higher-order evidence of some force 
that she has made a mistake in her first-order reasoning, most likely that she has 
relied on a way of forming moral intuitions which is not truth-conducive, or perhaps 
it is truth conducive, but then in this particular case she has made a performance 
error. This is A’s higher-order evidence. As the case is stated, A has no evidence 
that rebuts or undercuts this higher-order evidence. Hence, we contend that A 
should reduce her confidence in the disputed proposition. 
 Note that for A, the fact that she intuits in a certain way, is not good evidence 
that rebuts or undermines her higher-order evidence stemming from the 
disagreement with B. A has a strong moral intuition supporting p, and thus she 
believes p. But A’s belief that p, and her access to (introspective) evidence that she 
herself has the seeming that p, makes no headway against the suspicion that there 
might be something wrong with her belief that p, or the process upon which it is 
based, i.e. the moral intuition that p. So, A’s own intuition is no help against the 
hypothesis that her intuitions are misleading her. But A could have rebutting or 
undercutting evidence against the higher-order evidence. This would be evidence 
that suggests that A’s way of forming moral intuitions in the relevant domain is 
actually highly reliable. Suppose, for example, that an independent moral expert 
confirms for A that she has a remarkable accuracy in her intuitive judgements about 
this kind of cases. This would be evidence rebutting the higher-order evidence. Or 
suppose, instead, that some credible source correctly informs A that though B is 
generally reliable, someone has slipped a drug into her coffee such that on this 
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occasion B is entirely unreliable in her judgements regarding p. This would be 
undercutting evidence. 
3.2 Local evil and bizarre disagreements 
Consider then: 
 
Local evil disagreements. A has a clear intuition that all humans deserve equal 
respect, whereas B thinks that only the strong and successful deserve respect, 
while the weak deserve the death penalty. Other disagreements between A 
and B are either irrelevant to the issue at hand, or they are direct consequences 
of these conflicting moral intuitions.  
  
It may be difficult to point to actual cases of evil disagreements, but moral 
disagreement over racist, misogynist and supremacist views may come to mind. 
However, any candidate case of evil disagreement is likely to be contestable, not 
only because some might not find the views evil or abhorrent, but also because one 
might wonder whether candidate views are moral views at all, as distinct from some 
preferences of a non-moral kind. 
 Again, we can say that this disagreement provides A with higher-order 
evidence that she may have made a mistake in forming her intuition.12 However, 
                                               
12 Disagreements of a similar sort is discussed by Richard Rowland (2017a) and Kieran Setiya 
(2012). Setiya writes about moral monsters, i.e. individuals who have horrible moral beliefs. Clearly, 
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B’s intuition is evil, in the sense that it not only seems to support a false moral 
judgement, but one that is malignant as well. How should this affect A’s rational 
response to the disagreement? For A it is not just that B’s intuition differs from A’s, 
thus it must be wrong. Rather, B’s intuition has other features that qualifies it as 
evil. Assume that, independently of A’s particular intuition about equal respect, A 
has reason to think that B’s intuition is evil. Suppose further that, by default, evil 
intuitions are had by evil individuals and that evil individuals are not truth-sensitive 
(reliable) in the relevant moral domains. Then, it is not just that A and B disagree, 
it is also the case that the very content of B’s view constitutes a reason to suspect 
that B is entirely wrong in her intuition and moral judgment. In effect, this is 
undercutting evidence. The higher-order evidence provided by the disagreement is 
undercut by the content of B’s belief. Thus maybe, even if A’s reason for thinking 
that B’s intuition is evil in part relies on A’s assumption that all humans deserve 
equal respect, one might suggest that A should remain fairly steadfast. This is at 
least comparable to a revised version of Christensen’s restaurant case.13 In order to 
see what amount each of us needs to pay we add 15% and then divide the bill by 5. 
I say that the correct number is 43. You say that it is 583, which is more than the 
                                               
on behalf of conciliationism it might be objected that moral monsters are not peers. One problem 
with this response is whether the judgement that moral monsters are not peers is permitted given 
that one accepts the Independence Principle. See also our brief mention of the weak and strong 
evidence requirement below. 
13 Discussed by (Christensen 2007, p. 199). 
  
 
19 
total bill. I realize that not only do we disagree, but there must be something entirely 
wrong with your reasoning – you have made a mistake out of the ordinary. 
Christensen uses this case to show that one can, in some cases, remain steadfast in 
a disagreement, and disregard the opinion of one’s peer, without violating the 
Independence Principle. This of course presupposes that when A is evaluating B’s 
moral response, A is permitted to rely on her general moral beliefs and other 
considerations, relative to which B’s particular intuition comes across as evil. But 
on the HOE account, there is nothing to suggest that A could not do so. The HOE 
account does not commit to or rely upon the Independence Principle.  
 Reflection on this case suggests that B’s intuition need not be evil for A to be 
in a position to discount it, i.e. for the higher-order evidence provided by the 
disagreement to be undercut or rebutted. Consider a variant of the case: 
 
Local bizarre disagreement. B strongly intuits and believes that drinking 
coffee on Mondays is intrinsically morally better than drinking coffee on 
Tuesdays. A intuits no such thing and believes that there is no difference in 
intrinsic moral goodness to drinking coffee on different weekdays. Suppose 
that, apart from this odd disagreement, A and B have very similar moral 
intuitions, very similar general moral views, and that their views are equally 
coherent (as similar as they can be). 
 
Should A reduce her confidence? It seems not, though B’s intuition is by no means 
an evil intuition, and even if in other cases A has reason to believe that B’s capacity 
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of forming moral intuitions is highly reliable, A would have some reason to believe 
that B’s intuition is off track. We submit that this is because B’s view is bizarre in 
the sense that it is very difficult to imagine an account of right and wrong making-
features that would make B’s intuition about the ethics of coffee drinking come out 
true.14 In the absence of this, A should discount B’s intuition as misleading, and A 
should consider the evidence provided by the disagreement as equally misleading. 
So, A’s considerations about the possibility of giving a coherent account of how B 
might be right in his moral intuition undercuts the higher-order evidence provided 
by the disagreement.  
 Again, one might say that this reasoning violates the Independence Principle, 
if part of A’s reason for thinking that B is wrong rests on A’s intuition about the 
moral neutrality of coffee on different weekdays. This is using evidence that is not 
entirely independent of the disagreement itself, but the HOE account does not 
accept the Independence Principle.15 Again, to see the intuitive plausibility of this 
                                               
14 When is a moral view bizarre? Often professional philosophers claim to find their colleagues’ 
views bizarre, but professional philosophers’ judgement that some otherwise widely shared view is 
hard to make sense of is not quite what we are after. One might also think that if a moral intuition is 
widely held among otherwise reasonable people this counts against it being bizarre. On the other 
hand, given that we generally adopt moral beliefs that are entrenched in our culture, we might expect 
that a moral belief may become widespread even if it is bizarre in some sense, including our sense. 
Thanks to a reviewer for bringing up this issue.  
15 Note that it is not obvious that A’s reasoning needs to cite A’s specific intuition – it may be enough 
that A reasons from the apparent difficulty of making sense of B’s bizarre intuition. 
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response to bizarre disagreement, compare to a bizarre perceptual disagreement. I 
see someone from about 50 meters away, and I am confident that it is my colleague 
John. You, who are otherwise quite accurate in these matters, to my astonishment, 
say that it is not John, but a huge elephant. In this case, your belief is so far off track 
that I should consider the higher-order evidence undercut – since my visual 
perception is generally accurate, there must be some other explanation of your 
belief (one that does not presuppose that the accuracy of this perceptual belief of 
yours is within the normal range). Again, even if I suspend my belief that it is John 
rather than someone else, say Peter, that I see, I can set aside the possibility that it 
is a huge elephant. In these cases, it is difficult to see why I could not argue as 
follows: I saw John walking at a distance, but my friend thought he saw an elephant, 
hence I immediately suspected that something was wrong with him. So, my belief 
that I see John at a distance may be part of my reason to believe that you are off 
track. This, we suggest, is what the HOE account supports.16  
                                               
16 As the cases are described, one may wonder, as a reviewer did, whether local evil and bizarre 
disagreements provide even prima facie higher-order evidence in the first place. In response, one 
can modify the cases and add that the individuals in question are generally intelligent and thoughtful, 
or that we know that they form competent moral beliefs in other cases. It would then be natural to 
think that the disagreement yields some higher-order evidence, which is then in turn undercut. But 
of course, there is a general issue about distinguishing between cases in which higher-order evidence 
is undercut, and cases in which we might prefer to say that there is no such evidence in the first 
place. Note that the implications for the HOE account would be the same for local evil and local 
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3.3 Comprehensive disagreements 
Consider now cases in which the disagreement at hand is not about a singular moral 
intuition, but a wide range of moral beliefs:  
 
Comprehensive disagreement. A believes that p, where this belief is part of 
A’s much wider web of moral beliefs. B disagrees about p, but also disagrees 
with many parts of A’s web of moral beliefs. 
 
The kind of disagreement one finds between a prototypical conservative and liberal 
may fit this pattern. They disagree not only about some insulated issue, but about a 
whole cluster of views such as abortion, gay rights, gender equality, environmental 
protection, nuclear energy, equality, desert, individual freedom, the role of the 
welfare state, the use of military power.  
 Suppose that the agents’ moral systems of beliefs differ in comprehensive 
ways. There are many instances where the verdicts of A and B differ: they have 
different moral intuitions at important junctures, as well as different general moral 
beliefs. Yet, assume that their systems are roughly equally coherent and free of 
internal conflict. Suppose further that both systems are reasonable: it is not that 
                                               
bizarre disagreements even after the suggested modifications. According to the HOE account, if 
there is no prima facie higher-order evidence to begin with, we should not conciliate.  
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from A’s perspective, B is a depraved person, who would be grossly insensitive to 
moral truth, or that B’s system involves bizarre moral beliefs or intuitions that 
cannot be made sense of. Of course, A does believe that B is wrong, but not in the 
way of someone who is morally blind, perverted or evil. A has no particular 
explanation of why B is wrong – it is just that B seems to see a number of things 
differently. In this case, it seems that A should reduce her confidence (and likewise 
for B). After all, at each point of disagreement, at least one agent is mistaken. From 
A’s point of view, B’s perspective seems to be one that morally and epistemically 
well-functioning people could have, and still, A may believe that she got it right 
and B got it wrong, while having no particular reason to rule out that she might be 
wrong herself. So, the disagreement provides higher-order evidence that A might 
have made mistakes in her first-order moral reasoning and there is nothing to rebut 
or undercut that evidence. This is what the HOE account implies about 
comprehensive moral disagreements, when they are not evil or bizarre (for more 
caveats, see below). 
 Conciliationism’s response to comprehensive disagreements has been 
discussed assuming the Independence Principle. Adam Elga argues that 
comprehensive disagreements are common, but that the Independence Principle 
helps showing why conciliationism does not lead to wholesale skepticism in such 
cases (Elga 2007, pp. 492). His argument is that we have no reason (based on 
independent evidence) to assume that our interlocutors are epistemic peers in 
comprehensive disagreement, and hence we are not obliged to change our view. As 
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has been pointed out by others, this inference turns on which of the following we 
accept:17 
 
The strong evidence requirement. When A and B disagree about p, then A 
should conciliate (be agnostic), if and only if A has independent reason to 
believe that B is an epistemic peer. 
 
The weak evidence requirement. When A and B disagree about p, then A 
should conciliate (be agnostic), unless A has independent reason to believe 
that B is A’s epistemic inferior.18 
 
When combined with the weak evidence requirement, conciliationism is susceptible 
to skepticism as we rarely have independent reasons to believe that others are 
epistemic inferiors, but when combined with the strong evidence requirement 
conciliationism is less prone to skepticism, as we should only conciliate when we 
can positively affirm that others are epistemic peers.  
 We suggest that the HOE account offers a more plausible response to 
comprehensive disagreement, and to the problem of skepticism. The HOE account 
cannot accept anything like the Strong evidence requirement, so a non-skeptical 
                                               
17 See e.g. (Christensen 2011; Vavova 2014; Rowland 2017a). 
18  Here we arbitrarily state the evidence requirements from A’s point of view. 
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response cannot rest on this. Yet, we contend that the HOE account does not lead 
to wholesale skepticism, or at least not a variety of skepticism that seems intuitively 
implausible. This is, in part, because the conciliatory response advocated by the 
HOE account is limited to comprehensive disagreements that do not involve bizarre 
or evil views. It seems likely that A and B cannot have a comprehensive and non-
bizarre (and/or non-evil) disagreement, unless they also share at least some 
substantive moral views. Assume that A and B share general principles such as: 
harming innocent individuals is pro tanto wrong, promoting well-being is pro tanto 
good etc. This overlapping consensus might be in terms of general foundational 
principles (principles that pick out moral factors), or mid-level principles 
(principles that specifies practical guidelines for decision-making), or perhaps the 
consensus encapsulates classes of moral judgements about particular situations. A 
and B may justify mid-level principles, or classes of particular judgements in 
different ways (the justification may invoke different foundational principles), or if 
they agree on a general foundational principle, they may prefer different 
interpretations of it. So, there is a variety of different ways in which A and B’s 
moral systems could overlap, it would seem. If there are not one or more of these 
kinds of overlap between A and B it becomes difficult to believe that their 
disagreement is still non-bizarre. But given this, though A and B should reduce their 
confidence in the non-overlapping parts of their views, they could remain confident 
where their views converge. Indeed, they might have a reason, also supported by 
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the HOE account, to become more confident where they converge.19 So, if this is 
right, comprehensive disagreements as defined should not lead to wholesale moral 
skepticism. While the conservative and the liberal disagree about many things, they 
also have many points of convergence. 
 
3.4 Deep disagreement 
Consider next a more complicated form of disagreement which might also (but need 
not) be comprehensive:  
 
Deep disagreement. A and B disagree about p. However, A’s belief that p is 
grounded in a perspective, which includes basic methodological assumptions 
about which traditions, institutions, sources of evidence, patterns of reasoning 
to rely upon when forming moral beliefs. B’s perspective rejects the 
methodological assumptions that A asserts, and there is no common ground 
which A and B can resort to in order to resolve the dispute. 
 
So, A and B disagree about a range of issues, but these disagreements largely turn 
on a more fundamental disagreement about how to gather evidence or form beliefs 
about moral matters. Actual examples of this may be moral disagreements about 
abortion, homosexuality, contraception etc. based on different views about the role 
                                               
19 We elaborate the epistemic significance of convergence in ethics in (Kappel, Andersen et al. 
unpublished manuscript). 
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of religion in morality, or in particular, the status of sacred texts, or religious 
institutions’ authoritative interpretations of the moral content of such texts. 
 To make matters more concrete, suppose that A relies on his considered moral 
judgements about abortion, contraception and homosexuality when forming his 
moral beliefs, whereas B relies on an interpretation of a sacred book provided by a 
certain clerical authority. Of course, B also has moral intuitions, but where they 
conflict with the authorized interpretation of the scripture, B relies on the latter. We 
can also imagine that A and B both accept some sort of broad coherency 
requirement in their thinking, and that they roughly agree about the nature of these 
(for more on reflective equilibrium, see below). So, what sets A and B apart is that 
they radically disagree about which non-derivative moral beliefs should enter moral 
reflection about abortion, contraception and homosexuality, and this is because they 
radically disagree about how to gather and assess evidence for moral views. So, A 
and B in part disagree about which epistemic principles should govern our moral 
thinking (here we take an epistemic principle to be a norm for how to gather 
evidence, choose methods, or doxastic practices). A relies on one epistemic 
principle, whereas B relies on an incompatible one. Imagine that A and B’s systems 
of moral beliefs are on a par with respect to formal features such as coherency and 
consistency. So, from A’s perspective, the epistemic principle that B relies on is 
likely to lead B to false moral views, whereas B sees A in the same way. Imagine 
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also that there is no more fundamental principle or procedure that A and B can use 
to settle this disagreement about epistemic principles.20 
 Notice that deep disagreements are clearly different from comprehensive 
disagreements (discussed above) in that A and B, as a part of their perspective, have 
a theory about why their opponent tend to get the evidence wrong. As we defined 
comprehensive disagreements they do not involve assumptions about epistemic 
principles governing moral belief.  
 How should A and B respond to this kind of disagreement? According to the 
HOE account, the decisive question will be whether the disagreement constitutes 
undefeated higher-order evidence for the occurrence of a mistake on the first-order 
level (a principle error, a performance error, or an evidence error).21 
 Consider first A’s perspective. Should A think that her disagreement with B 
is evidence that she has made a performance error? Well, it is hard to see. For A, 
B’s dissenting view is entirely due to B’s adherence to belief forming practices that 
A considers wildly inappropriate and highly likely to generate false beliefs about 
the moral issue in question. Why would A think that this is any indication that she, 
A, might have made an error when thinking about the issue? For A, there is a 
perfectly good explanation of why B disagrees with her, and it has to do with B’s 
adherence to epistemic practices that A considers wrongheaded. Similarly, why 
should the disagreement with B make A doubt the propriety of her own practices? 
                                               
20 For more on this conception of deep disagreement see (Lynch 2010, 2016; Kappel 2012, 2018). 
21 This and the following paragraphs are revised material from (Kappel 2018). 
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Why should the fact that someone else uses a wrongheaded practice and reaches a 
false belief be evidence that one’s own epistemic principle is not truth-conducive? 
From B’s point of view, the story is similar, of course. B has no particular reason 
to take her disagreement with A to indicate that her own epistemic principles might 
be at fault, or that she might have made a mistake when applying them. Thus, in 
general terms the HOE account suggests that disagreement is prima facie higher-
order evidence of performance errors, principle errors, or evidence errors, and in 
response to this one should reduce one’s credence. However, in cases of deep 
disagreement, this higher-order evidence is undercut by evidence stemming from 
knowledge about the nature of the disagreement. In so far as deep disagreements 
are symmetrical, neither party should conciliate.  
 
3.5 Fundamental disagreements 
Richard Rowland briefly discusses a type of disagreement which is different from 
both comprehensive disagreements and deep disagreements as defined here:  
 
We frequently find ourselves in deep seemingly irresolvable disagreements 
about moral issues. [...] Many of these disagreements seem to be deep because 
they seem to be disagreements that are due to disagreements in fundamental 
non-derivative moral judgments. For instance, many pro-lifers think that 
foetuses have a moral status, many pro-choicers disagree and there is no more 
fundamental moral judgment that these conflicting moral judgments derive 
from. And many of these deep moral disagreements can also seem to be 
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irresolvable. For it is hard to imagine that (all or most) pro-choices and pro-
lifers, libertarians and socialists, and act-consequentialists and Kantians could 
come to agree about the moral matters that they disagree about by changing 
their fundamental moral judgments.22 
 
We take fundamental disagreements to concern conflicts in fundamental moral 
principles, say as in Rowland’s example, the principle that a human fetus has moral 
status versus a principle denying such a status. A disagreement between a Kantian 
and a Utilitarian would also qualify as fundamental in this sense, in that the Kantian 
accepts (say) some version of the categorical imperative, and thinks that other less 
fundamental principles or specific judgments are supported by the categorical 
imperative, whereas the Utilitarian accords some version of the principle of utility 
this foundational role. A moral principle is fundamental when it, in some sense, 
does not derive from other principles, while it still provides support for less 
fundamental principles or judgements.  
 To make the notion of a fundamental disagreement a bit more precise, let us 
say that a moral principle T is non-derivative for subject S when there is no other 
moral principle T’ that S could be epistemically justified in accepting and which 
                                               
22 (Rowland 2017a, p. 1). 
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would support S in believing T. Given this, it is natural to define what we call 
fundamental moral disagreement as follows:  
 
Fundamental disagreement. A believes a moral proposition p, and B believes 
not-p, and this is because (i) A accepts a moral principle TA and B accepts an 
incompatible principle TB, (ii) TA epistemically supports p, while TB 
epistemically supports not-p, (iii) TA (TB) is non-derivative for A (B): there 
are no others principles that A (B) could be epistemically justified in 
accepting and which would support A (B) in believing TA (TB). 
 
So, fundamental disagreements are basically disagreements over moral principles 
that are non-derivative and occupy a certain foundational justificatory role in one’s 
set of moral beliefs. Fundamental disagreements need not be comprehensive – they 
can involve only few, isolated moral beliefs. Further, fundamental disagreements 
need not be deep – A and B can have different moral outlooks that involve a non-
overlapping set of non-derivative moral principles in foundational roles without 
fundamentally disagree about how one should reason about moral beliefs. 
Fundamental disagreement is not about which epistemic principles that govern 
moral evidence and beliefs. A and B may, for example, accept different 
fundamental moral principles, but both accept that our moral beliefs should answer 
to both considered moral judgments and to coherency requirements, as is usually 
assumed in the method of reflective equilibrium. 
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 Fundamental disagreements are, Rowland says, “seemingly irresolvable”. 
Given our stipulation above, we can give a bit more content to this. Assume that a 
disagreement about p depends on principles TA and TB that are both fundamental 
for two subjects A and B, yet incompatible. It follows that there is no other set of 
principles that A and B could be epistemically justified in accepting, and which 
supports either TA and TB or their negations.23 Clearly, this would mean that the 
disagreement is dialectically irresolvable in a certain sense: there is no more 
fundamental moral principle that A can appeal to in order to provide a rationally 
compelling argument to B showing the falsity of the fundamental principle that B 
accepts, and the same is true for B with respect to A.24  
 Given the HOE account, how should one respond to fundamental 
disagreements? To make progress with this question, we need to make some 
assumptions about how we may become justified in accepting fundamental ethical 
principles. Assume some version of reflective equilibrium, according to which A 
                                               
23 Note that a principle T may be foundational in this sense for A, while the negation of T is not 
foundational for another subject B. We will ignore this complication here.  
24 Note that this dialectic impediment is compatible with the disagreement being resolvable in a 
different sense. Suppose that both A and B accept some version of reflective equilibrium (RE) and 
suppose A can make clear to B that A’s view is better in terms of RE than B’s, i.e. A’s view 
instantiates the good-making epistemic features of RE to a higher total degree than B’s view. If we 
assume that RE is (also) a theory about what theories to choose in ethical theory, then this could be 
a rationally convincing reason for B to change his view. 
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and B may be epistemically justified in accepting some non-derivative ethical 
principles in so far as these principles are supported by considered moral intuitions 
and are part of a system of beliefs that answers to the theoretical desiderata such as 
simplicity, generality and explanatory power, as well as the consistency of the belief 
system as a whole. Assume that A and B both reasonably insist that their view is 
not inferior to the other in terms of the theoretical desiderata involved in reflective 
equilibrium. 
 How, then, should A and B respond, according to the HOE account? Clearly, 
both A and B should take the disagreement to provide higher-order evidence that 
they have made mistakes in the process of reaching a view in reflective equilibrium. 
The process of adjusting a view to reach a reflective equilibrium endpoint involves 
making trade-offs between desiderata such as simplicity, generality and explanatory 
power against the intuitive acceptability of various implied judgements. It is not at 
all clear, in general, how this is best done. Thus, A and B cannot be very certain 
that they, rather than their opponent, have stricken the right balance between the 
various theoretical virtues. And if the fundamental disagreement is neither evil nor 
bizarre, it is hard to see how A or B could have rebutting or undercutting evidence 
defeating the higher-order evidence they get from the disagreement.  
 Note again the difference to deep disagreement. In deep disagreement, A has 
a defeater of the higher-order evidence because A believes that B is forming beliefs 
in what A takes to be an unreliable way. In fundamental disagreement, by contrast, 
A does not have a defeater of the higher-order evidence. A and B assume that they 
are both using the same general methods for generating moral beliefs, including 
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beliefs in fundamental principles, and yet they arrive at different conclusions. This 
makes fundamental disagreement similar to local benign disagreement, except that 
the disagreement concerns moral principles that play a certain kind of foundational 
justificatory role in one’s system of moral beliefs. So, we contend that the HOE 
account recommends conciliation in fundamental disagreements.  
 Note again that this is not a wholesale skeptical conclusion, for the reasons 
discussed earlier. Even if A and B have fundamental disagreements, they are likely 
to have many areas of overlap as well, or likely to convergence in mid-level 
principles, even where they accept incompatible fundamental principles. Thus, even 
when a fundamental disagreement forces A and B to reduce confidence in their 
incompatible non-derivative principles, they could still have high confidence in 
their overlapping consensus, including the mid-level principles or particular 
judgments supported by both TA and TB if such judgments exist. 
 
3.6 Fully theorized philosophical disagreement 
What we have called fundamental disagreements may just be a special case of a 
what we will refer to as:  
 
Fully theorized philosophical disagreement. A has the moral belief that p and 
has a clear philosophical grasp of which basic moral intuitions, normative 
assumptions and arguments her position depends upon. Further, A is fully 
aware of the total dialectic of possible counter-examples or counter-
arguments to these normative assumptions, and of the counter-arguments to 
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these counter-arguments etc. So, for any putative first-order moral argument 
against her view that A is aware of, she also knows how to deflect or rebut 
that argument. B disagrees with A regarding p but is otherwise in the same 
position as A, i.e. B is fully able to defend her view against every move that 
A might make.  
 
As we have defined it, fully theorized philosophical disagreements are an 
idealization, of course, but we contend that mature philosophical disagreements 
tend to approach it (e.g. philosophical debates over equality, freedom, abortion, 
animal rights, criminal justice etc.). As competing philosophical positions get 
elaborated, defended and better understood they tend to become closer to being 
fully theorized philosophical disagreements. This is the ideal, of course, but not 
always what happens – sometimes positions are abandoned as a result of careful 
scrutiny, and sometimes ill-defended theories persist. 
 Fully theorized philosophical disagreements are different from mere 
comprehensive disagreements in that A and B have counterarguments against one 
another’s position, and not just different views. Fully theorized philosophical 
disagreements need not be deep, i.e. they need not involve any disagreement about 
epistemic principles governing moral belief. Although the interesting fully 
theorized philosophical disagreements may often involve fundamental 
disagreements, they need not. And conversely, fundamental disagreements need not 
be fully theorized.  
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 According to the HOE account, how should one respond to fully theorized 
philosophical disagreements? Assume that the positions held by A and B are in part 
defended using some version of reflective equilibrium, i.e. by arguing that a 
particular view is better than others in terms of desiderata such as simplicity, 
generality, and explanatory power, and by being supported by our considered moral 
intuitions. So, the relevant views are upheld not only because they are defensible in 
the sense defining fully theorized disagreements, but also because their proponents 
think that their view results from a proper trade-off between desiderata in reflective 
equilibrium such as simplicity, generality, explanatory power and intuitive 
acceptability. Clearly, our disagreements with professional peers can be considered 
higher-order evidence that we might have opted for the wrong trade-offs in our 
efforts to identify a fully theorized moral view. Clearly, none of us understands the 
method of reflective equilibrium well enough to rule this possibility out, thus we 
do not generally have evidence that defeats this higher-order evidence. For similar 
views, see e.g. (Frances 2013; Goldberg 2013).25 
 
                                               
25 In our discussion of fundamental disagreement and fully theorized philosophical disagreements 
we assumed that agents are relying on reflective equilibrium as their method of reasoning. A 
reviewer questioned this assumption. We make this assumption to make the discussion manageable 
and more concrete, and it seems a far from problematic assumption as reflective equilibrium is 
probably the most widely used method of moral reasoning. Moreover, it seems to us that as long as 
two agents are using (are known to be using) the same methods, then the HOE account will 
recommend conciliation in both fundamental disagreements and in fully theorized disagreements.   
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4. Summary and concluding remarks 
We have outlined a general account of the epistemology of disagreement, the HOE 
account. The HOE account is a generic account the epistemology of disagreement, 
which applies to moral disagreement as well as to disagreements in other domains. 
The core idea of the HOE account is that disagreement provides higher-order 
evidence that one might have made a mistake in one’s first-order reasoning, and 
when this evidence is strong enough, and undefeated, one should respond by 
reducing one’s confidence in one’s affected first-order belief. We have argued that 
various types of moral disagreement of interest in recent debates differ with respect 
to whether they do generate undefeated higher-order evidence that one has made a 
mistake. As a consequence, the HOE account recommends conciliation in local 
benign disagreements, comprehensive disagreement, and fundamental 
disagreements, but not deep disagreements, bizarre disagreements and evil 
disagreement. The HOE account is generally conciliationist in spirit, but it doesn’t 
recommend conciliation in all cases, and, importantly, it avoids the skeptical 
implications that standard conciliationism is often thought to give rise to. Unlike 
standard conciliationism, the HOE account does not hinge on the Independence 
Principle, on the notion of an epistemic peer, or on the thorny issue of permissivism 
versus uniqueness. Further, the HOE account is motivated by strong general 
intuitions about the significance of higher-order evidence, and this sets the HOE 
account apart from other non-conciliationist views. 
 While we have not stated or defended the HOE account in all details, we have 
suggested that the HOE account is well-motivated and intuitively plausible. When 
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applying the account to cases of moral disagreement, we find that the HOE account 
is consistent with relevant and intuitively plausible distinctions between a variety 
of different forms of moral disagreement, and that it supports intuitively plausible 
verdicts about these cases.  
 Obviously, we do not want to suggest that the types of cases we have 
discussed constitute an exhaustive typology, and neither have we considered cases 
that combine the features that we have identified. Yet, it is too much to ask for any 
account of moral disagreement that it issues a clear verdict on any case of 
disagreement, no matter how complex it is. What we might reasonably hope for is 
an account that identifies and motivates some general principles for rational 
responses to disagreement, not an algorithm that determines a precise answer to any 
disagreement, however complicated. 
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